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AbsTrACT
In the Global Burden of Disease study, disease burden 
is measured as disability-adjusted life years (DaLYs). 
The paramount assumption of the DaLY is that it makes 
sense to aggregate years lived with disability (YLDs) 
and years of life lost (YLLs). However, this is not smooth 
sailing. Whereas morbidity (YLD) is something that 
happens to an individual, loss of life itself (YLL) occurs 
when that individual’s life has ended. YLLs quantify 
something that involves no experience and does not 
take place among living individuals. This casts doubt on 
whether the YLL is an individual burden at all. If not, 
then YLDs and YLLs are incommensurable. There are at 
least three responses to this problem, only one of which 
is tenable: a counterfactual account of harm. Taking this 
strategy necessitates a re-examination of how we count 
YLLs, particularly at the beginning of life.
The GlobAl burden of diseAse
The Global Burden of Disease (GBD) is ‘a system-
atic, scientific effort to quantify the comparative 
magnitude of health loss due to diseases, injuries 
and risk factors by age, sex and geographies for 
specific points in time’ (Murray et al, p20631; Mu
rray et al, p12). Since its first publication in the 
early 1990s, the GBD has grown to be a worldwide 
endeavour drawing on the expertise of several prin-
cipal actors in global health.3 Historically, epidemi-
ologists have concerned themselves chiefly with the 
mortality in a population and mortality rates and 
deaths averted were the standards for measuring 
disease burden.4 5 The GBD, however, aims to inte-
grate morbidity and mortality into disability-ad-
justed life years (DALYs). This summary measure is 
a significant contribution to studies of global health, 
as mortality alone cannot adequately capture what 
is intuitively understood by ‘the burden of disease’. 
To measure disease burden, we need to take account 
of both morbidity and mortality.
The DALY metric—the aggregation of years 
lived with disability (YLDs) and years of life lost 
(YLLs)—has become popular in the global health 
community. Publications using DALYs regularly 
feature in top journals, like The Lancet and the 
New England Journal of Medicine,1 3 6 and major 
organisations, like WHO and the World Bank,7 use 
DALY estimates. Furthermore, the GBD study—
which uses the DALY as its health metric—is used 
as evidence for informed policy-making.8 Yet, if the 
DALY is not conceptually sound, we risk ranking 
disabilities wrongly, measuring inequality in health 
on false premises, and perhaps even ranking health 
programmes suboptimally.
It is, therefore, vital that all the assumptions 
underlying the DALY are as well founded, coherent 
and plausible as possible. The DALY model relies on 
several assumptions that have been revised over the 
years.2 Previous operationalisations of the DALY 
included age-weighting, time discounting, sex 
differentiation and the use of Japanese life tables as 
a yardstick for an ideal lifespan to compute YLLs. 
Current practices, such as involving the public in 
setting disability weights (DWs) for the calculation 
of YLDs or using synthetic life tables across the 
globe for estimating the YLL at the time of death, 
reflect changing assumptions and recognition of the 
potential for improvement in the measure.8–12
Nonetheless, there is at least one critical assump-
tion that, we maintain, has not been given enough 
attention: the assumption that it makes sense to 
aggregate YLLs with YLDs into DALYs.i The aim of 
this paper is to address that underlying assumption.
The dAlY model
The DALY model was developed during the late 
1980s and early 1990s, building on earlier time-
based measures for quantifying health.4 5 13 14 The 
GBD 1990 launched the DALY, and its raison d'être 
was to obtain an integrated measure of morbidity 
and mortality. Since its conception, the DALY has 
primarily been concerned with individual burden. 
However, the need to clarify how death can be an 
individual burden may have been veiled from the 
first DALY model as this included age-weighting 
to reflect the ‘[s]ocial [burden] of the time lived at 
different ages’ (Murray, pp434–436).15 Following a 
methodological debate during the ensuing decades, 
societal burden has been excluded. The most recent 
DALY model has been revised with the explicit aim 
to reflect the individual’s own burden of disease, 
exclusively.ii2 Accordingly, the DALY needs to 
incorporate a well-founded account of the indi-
vidual burden of death which sets this paper’s topic 
at centre stage.
Today, DALYs measure the unhealth in a popu-
lation understood as aggregated individual burden.1 
Unlike most other time-based health-outcome 
measures—such as the quality-adjusted life year 
(QALY), which tries to put a value on the time spent 
in various (health) states16—the DALY purports to 
measure health impairment directly.
Some will suggest that our critique of the DALY 
will affect the QALY to an equal degree, partly 
because of the common misconception that ‘DALYs 
i This problem should not be confused with the incidence 
versus prevalence perspective for DALYs.8 15 35 45
ii In the words of Murray et al ‘burden should be assessed 
individual by individual’ (p14).2 However, the numerous 
value assumptions within the DALY make it doubtful that 
this aim has been achieved.9–12 46 47
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are inverse QALYs’.9 17–19 In fact, the DALY differs fundamen-
tally from the QALY in at least two important respects. First, the 
DALY is a so-called negative gap-measure purporting to quantify 
the burden suffered as a consequence of experienced unhealth 
directly.2 8 15 In contrast, the QALY measures the value of being 
alive. Second, while the QALY does not require any particular 
value associated with ‘being dead’, the DALY is defined in terms 
of such a burden. In the words of Murray and colleagues: ‘[t]he 
basic unit of measurement for [the DALY] is lost years of healthy 
life’ (p14).2 Taken together, the DALY thus assumes and relies 
on a coherent concept of the individual burden associated with 
‘being dead’. The QALY model does not. The QALY is a pure 
time-based measure of the value of time spent alive relative to 
one’s health state.
While it is common to describe the QALY model as assigning 
the zero value to ‘being dead’,16 this is merely a heuristic. In fact, 
the QALY assigns, in the limit, zero value as time approaches 
zero which is what endows the QALY model with ratio scale 
properties, rather than just interval scale properties.20 The 
primary attribute of death in the QALY model is that for the 
dead, time is no more; accordingly, there is nothing to be valued. 
We can however extend the QALY model by assigning zero to 
‘being dead’. In fact, this is the only consistent extension of the 
QALY model, compatible with the necessary assumption that the 
dead are expelled from the matrix of time.
To sum up, the QALY is concerned with living individuals 
exclusively, and nothing in the QALY model corresponds to the 
YLL. When an individual die, intraindividual QALY aggregation 
ends. In the DALY model, YLLs—which does not happen during 
your life—are integral. The estimation of QALY values requires 
comparing various durations of time spent in different health 
states, and never relies on any direct comparisons with death. 
The DALY, on the other extreme, postulates that a year of ‘being 
dead’ is a viable unit for burden. While the QALY losses esti-
mated for a deceased individual may be said to assume some-
thing about the non-aggregation of QALYs after death, this is, in 
fact, not part of the QALY model itself. In the DALY model, the 
burden of death is interwoven into its fabric. This latter obser-
vation contradicts the widely held belief that DALYs are inverse 
QALYs, and suggests that this heuristic for understanding one of 
these models in terms of the other has been extrapolated too far. 
While the QALY resides among the living, the DALY model must 
cross the river Styx.
See figure 1 for a graphical illustration. For the DALY, as we 
argue below, the situation is entirely different.
YeArs of life losT
The fundamental principle that ‘[t]ime is the unit of measure for 
the burden of disease’ has been retained from the original formu-
lation of the DALY (Murray et al, p132; Murray, p4312). The 
DALY component the YLL is by definition taken as a burden. It is 
assumed to be quantified by itself: the number of years in the gap 
between the time of an individual’s death and some ideal length 
of life is defined as identical to the burden imposed on that indi-
vidual by his/her death. There are many issues pertaining to esti-
mating the ideal remaining lifespan of an individual at the time 
of his/her premature death. However, the previous paragraph 
covers the fundamental definition of the YLL: burden equals the 
number of life years lost.
YeArs lived wiTh disAbiliTY
To integrate mortality—measured by the YLL—and morbidity, 
the DALY model includes a second component: the YLD. In 
order to define the YLD, time is again taken as the basic unit of 
measurement.2 Previous works on the YLD have relied on QALY-
type measurements, including standard gamble, time trade-off and 
person trade-off.15 21 Furthermore, in line with the explicit aim of 
not measuring disvalue as such, but rather ‘objective unhealth’, the 
current YLD relies on a representative sample of laymen’s evalu-
ation of the degree of unhealth represented by various medical 
conditions, suitably described by an expert panel. The DWs are then 
assigned based on a mixture of two methods: the person trade-off 
and latent utility-like discrete choice tasks.2
This procedure results in DWs (DWA) for the various condi-
tions A, which yield YLDs when multiplied by duration T:
 DWA × T = YLD 
Figure 1 The quality-adjusted life year (QALY) model. 
Figure 1 illustrates the QALY for one individual. In panel 
1 the leftmost dashed vertical line represents the time of 
diagnosis and a possibility for starting up with treatment. 
This is followed by one of two counterfactual scenarios: 
One scenario is illustrated by the solid green curve (we 
refer to this as h1) and represents the likely progression 
without treatment. This scenario results in a number of 
experienced QALYs that is equal to the area under the 
curve (AUC) denotedA (see panel 2). The alternative 
scenario is illustrated by the dashed green line (we refer 
to this as h2) and represents the likely progression with 
treatment. In this alternative, the QALYs experienced 
are represented by the AUC denoted B = A + A′ (see 
panel 2). The difference in accrued QALYs between these 
two counterfactual scenarios is the QALY gain, here 
represented by the area A′. In order to calculateA′ we 
need not rely on the assumption that the value of ‘being 
dead’ is 0. We see that the QALY gainA′ can be computed 
as the difference between the two areas:A′ = B − A. 
However, if one would like (as is often convenient) to 
compute this difference as the integral between two 
curves—viz as roughly the area beneath the dashed black 
curve—then the scenario without treatment must be 
equipped with a value udeath for the part of the integral 
where only h2 is initially defined; as h1 is a priori only 
defined between 0 and t1. In order to be consistent with 
the QALY paradigm udeath must satisfy the equation: ∫ t2
0 h2(x) dx −
∫ t1
0 h1(x) dx =
∫ t1
0 h2(x) − h1(x) dx +
∫ t2
t1 h2(x) − udeath dx.  
This equation  obviously obtains if and only if udeath = 0.
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The DALYs are then computed as the sum of the YLDs and the 
YLLs (see figure 2).
But note how the equation reduces to 0 if time is zero. This 
equation hints as to what we view as the problem with the current 
DALY: the YLD is a measure of an inherently two-dimensional 
construct with unit DW×T—burden of disability times duration. 
The YLL, on the other hand, is by definition a one-dimensional 
construct, measured by its duration only. Unless a sound DW for 
‘being dead’ can be produced, one cannot add YLLs and YLDs 
together in its current form. The reason is that the first has unit 
time, while the latter has unit disability times time. An analogy 
would be adding a length to an area.
There are at least two objections to this dimensional concern. 
First, some may maintain that the DWs are mere scalars which 
means that the YLD measures a percentage of the YLL. Then, 
being blind (DW=0.19: this and later DWs are taken from 
Salomon et al’s 2015 publication21) for 1 year equals 19% 
of ‘being dead for 1 year’.iii However, if the YLL is merely a 
one-dimensional stretch of time, it does not yet embody any 
burden or disvalue which can be scaled. There is nothing—
corresponding to disvalue—to calculate 19% from. Surely, to 
be blind for 1 year is not the same as ‘being dead’ for 19% of 
365 days, that is, 69.35 days. The DW must, rather, relate to 
the disvalue of ‘being dead’. The YLD, on the other hand, is 
two-dimensional as it cannot exist independently of time and 
that—je ne sais quoi—without which the YLD would be time 
only.
Second, the antipodal objection is to maintain that the 
intended interpretation of the YLL is that its DW ‘DWDeath’ is 
equal to 1—by definition. This defence is circular: the YLD is 
supposed to be defined in terms of the YLL and therefore cannot 
appeal to some value of being alive. Of course, our issue is not 
with the choice of 1, but rather we question the assumption that 
any DW can be assigned to ‘being dead’ if YLLs is the founda-
tional concept.
Where does this leave the current DALY? The burden of 
death is defined to be the number of years lost compared 
with an ideal lifespan. The burden of living with morbidity is 
morbidity’s duration weighted by a comparison with living in 
full health. But recall that the yardstick for the DALY is the 
burden of death, not the other way around. The burden of 
blindness is supposedly not compared with not being blind, 
but rather how much less it burdens you than ‘being dead’. 
The DALY is, therefore, not a gap-measure until one applies an 
account of how death burdens someone compared with being 
alive (in full health) compared with being blind (compared with 
being in full health). This seeming circularity is a problem for 
the DALY.
inCommensurAbiliTY
The DALY model claims equivalence between YLLs and YLDs. 
The crucial question is if such equivalence makes sense? Whether 
or not it is meaningful to aggregate YLLs and YLDs into one 
summary number is partly a question of the commensurability 
of these quantities. There is a vast literature on commensura-
bility.22–24 However, the question of whether the YLL and the 
YLD are, in fact, commensurable has received limited attention.
To begin with, two values are incommensurable when they 
lack a common measure. There are stronger and weaker types 
of incommensurability. Strong incommensurability occurs when 
something cannot be compared at all. One standard definition is 
that two values are strongly incommensurable when ‘the one is 
neither more valuable than the other, nor less, and not of equal 
value’ (Bradley et al, eds, p79).25 Strong incommensurability 
would apply to YLDs and YLLs if, as far as they are individual 
burdens, nothing can be said as to which is the lesser, nor if they 
iii Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for making this point.
Figure 2 The DALY model. Lifetime DALYs for an individual 
with two periods of illness, followed by premature death. 
The yellow and red colours represent YLDs and YLLs, 
respectively. The YLD areas are delineated by the duration 
on the time axis and the disability weights DWi for the 
two conditions. The light red area is defined by erecting 
a rectangle of height 1 over the dark red line segment 
representing the number of years of life lost to premature 
death. The total of the light red and yellow areas constitutes 
the DALY. The DALY model assumes that it makes sense 
to attribute a burden of 1 to the YLLs; we challenge this 
assumption. DALYs, disability-adjusted life years; YLDs, years 
lived with disability; YLLs, years of life lost.
Figure 3 Three responses. We explore three possible 
responses to the incommensurability problem, two of 
which we consider untenable (1 and 2). On the rescue 
strategy (3) there are two main avenues: (3.1) argues 
that YLDs and YLLs, in fact, quantify something other 
than individual burden, while (3.2) (which we endorse) 
argues that the YLD and the YLL can be commensurable—
as individual burden—conditional on adopting a 
counterfactual account of harm. YLDs, years lived with 
disability; YLLs, years of life lost.
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are equal. It is no trivial matter to establish commensurability for 
YLLs and YLDs. After all, the YLL and the YLD seemingly lack 
a common yardstick, as individual YLLs do not appear to have a 
temporal extension for anyone.
A weaker type of incommensurability is called trumping or 
lexical orderings. The latter term derives from the fact that 
such orders resemble the alphabetical ordering of finite letter 
combinations. Lexical incommensurability does not deny that 
the incommensurable magnitudes are ordered or that they 
belong to the same class of entities but rather that the problem 
is to measure them in a common finite unit since they inhabit 
different ‘tiers of importance’. Such orderings must, if they are 
to be represented numerically, be mapped to number systems 
which contain so-called non-standard numbers.iv
The CommensurAbiliTY of The Yld And The Yll
We take the DALY to posit that YLDs and YLLs are commen-
surable. It appears more than reasonable to postulate that 
morbidity (and therefore YLDs) burdens the individual who 
embodies that morbidity. But accounting for how exactly death 
(understood as YLLs) burdens the deceased is demanding. To 
elaborate: the dying process burdens the living individual and 
is accounted for by the YLD. Note that when we talk about 
death, we do not mean this process of dying. By death, we refer 
to the instant in which someone goes from being alive to not 
living. We assume that death implies permanent non-existence,26 
which makes ‘being dead’ an oxymoron. ‘Being dead’ would, if 
anything, mean the absence of any health state. It appears that 
the two constructs we are trying to relate via a common measure 
might not even belong to the same domain.
A viable avenue of inquiry should begin with the following 
question: Can death be bad for the individual who dies? If the 
answer is negative, we must conclude that YLLs cannot be an 
individual burden. This implies that the YLD and the YLL are 
incommensurable, as illustrated in figure 2. If the answer is affir-
mative, on some account X, we can proceed to the next ques-
tion: Does X provide commensurability between the YLD and 
the YLL?
There are several arguments against the view that death is 
bad for those who die, and the three strongest of them concern 
experience, time and symmetry. According to the experience 
argument, burdens are something we must experience. But, we 
cannot experience while ‘being dead’. Thus, death cannot be 
bad for us. According to the time argument, most burdens begin 
at a time and are bad for us through time but there is no time 
when death is bad for us. When we are alive, we have not lost 
our lives, and when we ‘are dead’, we do not exist. Therefore—
the argument goes—death cannot be bad for us.v According to 
the symmetry argument, we do not consider the non-existence 
before our lives as a burden, so why should the non-existence 
aftervi our lives—death—be one?27 Any of these three Epicurean 
arguments makes it questionable whether the YLL quantifies an 
individual burden at all.vii
iv  Non-Archimedean number systems, employing so-called infinitesimals 
and infinite numbers, are readily available but they are unfit for standard 
health economic analysis.
v The two first arguments are rooted in Epicurus.48
vi This latter argument is rooted in Lucretius.27
vii Note that the problem is not one of terminology. We do not believe 
YLLs are mislabelled as a burden but that they are, in fact, incommensu-
rable with YLDs.
Notice how the YLD is unaffected by these arguments. First, 
morbidity is usually something that people experience. Second, 
morbidity happens at a time and is harmful through time. Third, 
it is not unreasonable that we count people’s past and future 
morbidity as equally bad in the GBD. Accordingly, there are 
several significant asymmetries between the YLD and the YLL, 
which we have summarised in table 1.
Two things being different in important aspects do not, in and 
of itself, imply their incommensurability. But if these three argu-
ments are correct, then the YLL cannot be an individual burden 
and so YLDs and YLLs are incommensurable qua individual 
burdens.
In brief, the above poses two foundational problems for the 
DALY. First, we must provide a reasonable account of the burden 
associated with YLLs that overcomes the three Epicurean argu-
ments. Second, this account must give rise to a notion of burden 
that makes YLLs commensurable with YLDs.
Three responses
We can think of at least three responses to this incommensura-
bility problem—ignore, accept or rescue (see figure 3). 
ignore the problem
The first response is simply to ignore the problem; the DALY is 
a convenient tool for measuring unhealth and sufficiently good 
to the extent that the public accepts it. This answer is unsatisfac-
tory. The GBD study is supposed to provide evidence to inform 
public policy.8 A burden is something that we should get rid of, 
it demands action and it is too imperative to be measured incor-
rectly. Consequently, we reject this response as adequate.
Accept the incommensurability
The second response is to accept that YLDs and YLLs are, in 
fact, incommensurable and refrain from aggregating them 
into DALYs. There is nothing inherently wrong in reporting 
YLDs alongside YLLs, and allow decision-makers to act on this 
information as they see fit, but the splitting strategy is not an 
easy solution either. This destroys the DALY’s raison d'être of 
obtaining an integrated measure of morbidity and mortality, and 
it yields two competing measures of burden, which would imply 
that we de facto abandon the DALY model.
Given the purpose of the DALY model as a resource in poli-
cy-making,8 we will need to know how to trade-off YLDs and 
YLLs. Given strong incommensurability, there is certainly no 
answer to this trade-off if any number of YLDs is not worse, better 
or equal to any number of YLLs. Given the weak incommensura-
bility, it is, moreover, not satisfactory if YLLs always trump YLDs 
or vice versa. Under either type of incommensurability, policy 








Concern about individual burden
Experience: Do we experience it? Yes No
Time: Does it harm us through 
time? Yes No
Symmetry: Does it treat the past 
and future equally? Yes No
Based on the three arguments, we may question whether YLLs measure an 
individual burden, if not, then YLDs and YLLs will be incommensurable.
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based on YLDs and YLLs will not make much sense. Hence, we 
discard this position.
rescue
The third option is to rescue their commensurability by one of 
two strategies: (3.1) redefine the YLD and the YLL so that they 
no longer concern individual burden, thereby being commensu-
rable for something else or (3.2) argue that the YLD and the YLL 
are, in fact, commensurable for individual burden.
(3.1) Redefining can be done in at least two ways. First, 
(3.1.1) we could consider the DALY as a measure of ‘popu-
lation burden’. On such a queer view, the burden belongs to 
the population proper rather than the individual proper, and 
so avoids the Epicurean arguments, as the population remains 
while individuals enter and leave. To our knowledge, no one 
has hitherto offered an adequate account of population burden 
in this sense. It is reasonable to believe that what matters is 
that disability is a burden for individual human beings. If the 
burden we measure does not burden us, we fail to see why 
we should care about it. Moreover, such a view departs from 
the stated aims of the DALY. For these reasons, we discard this 
position.
A second strategy (3.1.2) is to redefine the DALY as a measure 
of societal burden. Societal burden, in this context, refers to 
everyone who is indirectly affected by the disease burden in 
question. This strategy has a certain pull to it as premature 
death clearly affects family, friends and the wider society. Such a 
strategy could take several forms. One could adopt a pure soci-
etal burden-account, and the canonical choice would then be 
to measure the burden in pecuniary terms: for example, a will-
ingness-to-pay measure. This is abdicating from the task of the 
DALY.15
Another way is adopting a combined account of individual 
and societal burden. For instance, by claiming that the YLL is a 
type of individual burden which is nevertheless distinct from the 
type of individual burden measured by the YLD—i.e. the YLL 
as a burden on individuals other than the deceased. To such an 
account, the three Epicurean arguments do not apply. In contrast 
to the population burden-account, the burden is now placed 
on other ephemeral individuals rather than on the permanent 
population. There are two challenges with this latter approach. 
For one, this combined strategy implies that YLDs and YLLs 
will never belong to the same individual. Hence, it makes less 
sense to monitor inequalities in health by DALYs. For another, 
there is a slippery slope in this strategy. It is hard to see how we 
can maintain that Alice’s death would burden Beth, but Alice’s 
broken leg would not. Pursuing such an avenue, it seems, would 
lead us to a ‘gross domestic product (GDP) of burdens’ rather 
than a metric for individual burden. This would directly contra-
dict the egalitarianviii aim of the GBD.8
Strategy (3.2) is, we will argue, more promising. We know 
that YLDs quantifies unhealth; an inherently multidimensional 
construct. More precisely, in GBD 2015, the YLD quantifies 
the burden of 235 distinct conditions. In other words, it is 
assumed that these conditions are commensurable as indi-
vidual burdens. However, several of these conditions are not 
intuitively commensurable for a common value. Compare, for 
instance, mild low back pain, moderate hearing loss, amputation 
of one arm with treatment or severe dementia.21 The question 
is: What is the unifying attribute common in these otherwise 
viii That is, the egalitarian standard of measurement as opposed to an egal-
itarian distribution of the measured burden.
quite different conditions that make them commensurable qua 
burden? To answer this, we will need an account of harm, to 
begin with.
Conditions measured in the GBD categorised as musculo-
skeletal disorders such as low back pain or neck pain are intui-
tively harmful because they involve a continuous experience of 
pain. On the other hand, conditions like complete hearing loss 
and vision loss are not primarily harmful because of what you 
experience but rather because of what you do not experience. 
Moreover, amputation of limbs is harmful because the loss of the 
limb can incur a significant opportunity loss for the individuals 
in question.ix These latter examples thus clearly presume a coun-
terfactual account of harm.
How does this account explain the burden of the YLL? Given 
our assumption that death implies permanent extinction, death 
most certainly is nothing like experiencing pleasure or pain. 
Death cannot harm us in an absolute or robust sense. In the phil-
osophical literature, the standard account is that death harms 
those who die in a comparative sense only.
To clarify, note that we are not alluding to any particular 
theory. Rather, we are aiming to appeal to some theory which 
can adequately account for how Epicurus—during his exis-
tence—could have been harmed by his death by an appeal to 
how his life could counterfactually have ended had he not died 
when he did.
A counterfactual account of harm seems capable of countering 
the experience argument: something can be bad for you, coun-
terfactually, even if inexperienced. With regard to symmetry, if 
death is counterfactually bad for us then why cannot the begin-
ning of our existence be counterfactually bad for us? We do not 
regard the symmetry argument as a strong one. While our deaths 
lie in an open future, our pre-existence lies in a fixated past. It 
seems reasonable that counterfactual harm should be directed 
at an open future. In brief, while the beginning of an individu-
al’s existence is a highly elusive concept, we maintain that harm 
happens to existing individuals and that counterfactual harm is 
connected to one’s counterfactual futures, and not one’s coun-
terfactual pasts.
We are then left with the timing of death’s badness. Some 
may argue that the foundational question is whether a deceased 
person can have a well-being level. According to one posi-
tion—subsequentism—your well-being level is reduced to 
zero at all times when you counterfactually could have been 
alive.25 28 This account, if correct, provides a yes to the question 
of whether death can be an individual burden. This theory also 
seems to accomplish the second task by being a theory X which 
gives credibility to commensurability. There are problems with 
subsequentism that we do not discuss here.29 30
What is the status of a person’s well-being-determining or 
health-determining properties?x If there is no such correlate, does 
this mean that we must abandon the DALY?
There may be alternative views for death’s badness—that 
unifies the YLD and the YLL—and that avoids appealing to 
well-being levels for ‘being dead’. While inquiry into such well-
being levels is indeed fruitful—since they would likely suffice 
for commensurability—we do not believe that such well-being 
levels are necessary. The main difference between accepting and 
rejecting well-being levels for ‘being dead’ is that accepting them 
allows constructing YLDs from YLLs (this is the current DALY 
model). While rejecting such levels likely leaves constructing 
ix Phantom pain is not the characteristic feature of amputated limbs.
x Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this question.
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YLLs from YLDs the only viable option. This latter strategy 
would amount to a push in the direction of actually making 
DALYs inverse QALYs. All these strategies seem to bring a notion 
of well-being into the DALY framework which is counter to the 
stated aims of the GBD.2xi
There are several possible views for the timing or non-timing 
of death’s badness,xii and challenges of forecasting the relevant 
counterfactual scenarios that we do not discuss here. That being 
said, a counterfactual notion of harm seems to be the most viable 
option for making the YLD and the YLL commensurable. As a 
starting point, death is bad (or good) compared with the life you 
could have had, had you not died.xiii This means that reference 
to counterfactual scenarios can help explain how death harms 
us.25 26 28 31–34
We recognise that the DALY is often referred to as a gap-mea-
sure.35–37 In this sense, it relies on counterfactual thinking. But 
note that YLLs and YLDs separately are motivated counterfac-
tually as gaps to two—although different—ideals. First, a condi-
tion’s DW is the gap to ideal health, and second, the YLL is the 
gap between the time of death and ideal longevity. But this does 
not ensure their commensurability. Our proposal is that in order 
for YLDs and YLLs to be commensurable for individual burden, 
one must rely on a counterfactual account of harm.
It is because death harms us in a comparative sense that death 
(and therefore YLLs) is an individual burden. For that reason, 
whatever is measured by YLLs and YLDs have something 
important in common: the counterfactual harm. In this way, 
YLDs and YLLs may become commensurable. If accepted, this 
strategy will allow us to speak of DALYs as a pure measure of 
individual burden.
This strategy will come at a cost for the GBD authors: they 
will need to take a stance on which counterfactual account of the 
harm of death that is the correct one.
In the current GBD, around 2.7 million annual neonatal deaths 
are counted. The major cause of these deaths is prematurity. 
Moreover, each of these deaths is counted as the greatest possible 
burden (approximately 86 DALYs). On the other hand, there are 
around 2.6 million annual stillbirths,xiv38 and these deaths do not 
contribute to the DALY count. Stillbirths have recently been esti-
mated and monitored39 but do not presently40 generate YLLs.xv 
Additionally, we can reasonably ask why a death just before 
birth is not at all harmful (ie, not bad in a comparative sense), 
while a death just after birth is the worst possible harm.xvi If a 
counterfactual account of harm is to underlie the YLL, this will 
involve a re-examination of the age at which we should begin 
counting YLLs and at which age death should incur the greatest 
number of YLLs. We argue that the issue of which individuals 
that can generate DALYs should be informed by the answer to 
xi  Broome (unpublished manuscript) furthers an argument for why the 
DALY should measure well-being rather than health.
xii In addition to subsequentism, the other views that reject the time argu-
ment are priorism, concurrentism, atemporalism, eternalism and indefi-
nitism. Among these views, subsequentism, atemporalism and priorism 
are most popular.30
xiii There are several technical expositions of counterfactual harm 
accounts25 28 31–33 but we do not want to commit to any particular 
version here.
xiv That is, WHO definition of antenatal fatality between 28th week of 
gestation and birth.
xv Even though there is a considerable overlap in conditions that incur 
stillbirths and premature neonatal deaths, for example, sepsis and 
encephalopathy.
xvi As the GBD authors note, an estimation of fetal deaths is an important 
area of future work (Murray et al, p8).2
the following question: Which individuals can be counterfactu-
ally harmed by their death? We remain agnostic to what age one 
should begin the DALY count and refer to the growing literature 
on this critical issue for further guidance.40–44
ConClusion
In this paper, we have addressed one critical objection to the 
DALY model. We have argued that YLLs and YLDs are, in fact, 
incommensurable unless the individual burden of the YLL is 
explained. Neglecting this problem is not an option. Moreover, 
we offer a solution to this problem: a counterfactual account 
of harm. However, this counterfactual strategy implies that we 
need to readdress the question of at what age and time death can 
be counterfactually harmful to the individual.
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